Relations between speech production and speech perception: Some behavioral and neurological observations by Levelt, W.
14 
Relations between Speech Production and 
Speech Perception: Some Behavioral and 
Neurological Observations 
Willem J. M. Levelt 
One Agent, Two Modalities 
There is a famous book that never appeared: Bever and Weksel (shelved). 
It contained chapters by several young Turks in the budding new psycho-
linguistics community of the mid-1960s. Jacques Mehler’s chapter (coau-
thored with Harris Savin) was entitled “Language Users.” A normal 
language user “is capable of producing and understanding an infinite 
number of sentences that he has never heard before. The central problem 
for the psychologist studying language is to explain this fact—to describe 
the abilities that underlie this infinity of possible performances and state 
precisely how these abilities, together with the various details . . . of a 
given situation, determine any particular performance.” There is no hesi-
tation here about the psycholinguist’s core business: it is to explain our 
abilities to produce and to understand language. Indeed, the chapter’s 
purpose was to review the available research findings on these abilities 
and it contains, correspondingly, a section on the listener and another 
section on the speaker. 
This balance was quickly lost in the further history of psycholinguistics. 
With the happy and important exceptions of speech error and speech 
pausing research, the study of language use was factually reduced to 
studying language understanding. For example, Philip Johnson-Laird 
opened his review of experimental psycholinguistics in the 1974 Annual 
Review of Psychology with the statement: “The fundamental problem of 
psycholinguistics is simple to formulate: what happens if we understand 
sentences?” And he added, “Most of the other problems would be half-
way solved if only we had the answer to this question.” One major other 
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problem is, of course, How do we produce sentences? It is, however, by 
no means obvious how solving the issue of sentence or utterance under-
standing would halfway solve the problem of sentence or utterance 
production. 
The optimism here is probably based on the belief that utterance pro-
duction is roughly utterance understanding in reverse. In fact, that has 
long been a tacit belief among psycholinguists in spite of serious argu-
ments to the contrary, such as these: “An ideal delivery in production 
requires completeness and well-formedness at all linguistic levels in-
volved. The pragmatics should be precisely tuned to the discourse situa-
tion. The words, phrases, sentences should be accurate and precise 
renditions of the information to be expressed. Syntax and morphology 
have to be complete and well-formed and the same holds for the segmen-
tal and suprasegmental phonology of the utterance. Finally, the phonetic 
realization has to conform to the standards of intelligibility, rate, formal-
ity of the speech environment” (Levelt, 1996, p. x). These representations 
are generated completely and on the fly, that is, incrementally. This multi-
level linguistic completeness and well-formedness is in no way required 
for successful utterance understanding. “Almost every utterance that we 
encounter is multiply ambiguous, phonetically (I scream), lexically (the 
organ was removed), syntactically (I enjoy visiting colleagues), semanti-
cally (there are two tables with four chairs here) or otherwise. As listeners 
we hardly notice this. We typically do not compute all well-formed parses 
of an utterance, even though ambiguities can produce momentary rip-
ples of comprehension. Parsing is hardly ever complete. Rather, we go 
straight to the one most likely interpretation, given the discourse situa-
tion” (Levelt, 1996, p. x). In other words, the aims of the two systems 
are deeply different: attaining completeness is a core target of produc-
tion; ambiguity is hardly ever a problem. Attaining uniqueness in the face 
of massive ambiguity is a core target of speech perception; completeness 
of parsing should definitely be avoided—it would make the system 
explode. 
Meanwhile, the unbalance of comprehension vs. production perspec-
tives in psycholinguistics has been somewhat redressed. After three de-
cades, the title (and the content) of Herbert Clark’s 1996 treatise Using 
Language returns us to the language user who is as much a speaker as a 
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listener. It is not in detail Mehler and Savin’s language user; that one was 
mainly concerned with relating surface phonetic and underlying semantic 
representations, but these are still core ingredients of a language user in 
Clark’s sense, a participant in intentional, joint action. 
It is, in my opinion, a major theoretical and empirical challenge to 
reconcile the unicity of the language user as an agent with the fundamen-
tal duality of linguistic processing, speaking, and understanding. In 
the following, I first consider some perception-production relations from 
the perspective of our speech production model, which has been tak-
ing shape over the years. I then change the perspective to cognitive 
neuroscience, not only because the recent neuroimaging literature often 
provides additional support for the existing theoretical notions but also 
because it provides new, additional challenges for how we conceive of 
the production-perception relations. 
Speech Perception in a Model of Production 
The theory of production proposed in Levelt (1989) and the further mod-
eling of its lexical access component in Levelt, Roelofs, and Meyer (1999) 
postulate three types of relation between the productive and receptive 
mechanisms of the language user. They reside in the “perceptual loop,” 
in the concept-lemma system, and in connections at the form level. I con-
sider them in turn. 
The Perceptual Loop 
The global architecture of the speaker as proposed in Levelt (1989) is 
essentially a feedforward system. Utterances are incrementally produced 
going through stages of conceptual preparation, grammatical encoding, 
phonological encoding, and articulation. The perceptual component in 
this architecture consists of a dual-feedback loop. As a speaker you are 
normally hearing your own overt speech and that will be parsed just as 
any other-produced speech you hear or overhear. The one crucial dif-
ference is that the attribution of the speech is to self. That being the 
case, the speaker may use it for self-monitoring. As in any complex motor 
action, speaking involves some degree of output control. If the self-
perceived speech is disruptively deviant from the intended delivery, you 
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may self-interrupt and make a repair (see Levelt, 1983, for details of this 
self-monitoring mechanism). As a speaker you can, in addition, monitor 
some internal, covert representation of the utterance being prepared. The 
1989 model identified this “internal speech” as the phonetic code that 
serves as input to the articulatory mechanism, that is, the stuff that you 
can temporarily store in your “articulatory buffer” (Morton, 1970). Ex-
perimental evidence obtained by Wheeldon and Levelt (1994), however, 
supports the notion that the code is more abstract. Effective self-monitor-
ing is not wiped out when the articulatory buffer is filled with nuisance 
materials. The more likely object of internal self-monitoring is the self-
generated phonological representation, a string of syllabified and prosod-
ified phonological words. Both the external and the internal feedback 
loops feed into the language user’s normal speech-understanding system. 
The model is maximally parsimonious in that it does not require any 
reduplication of mechanisms (as is often the case with alternative models 
of self-monitoring). 
Shared Lemmas and Lexical Concepts 
The 1989 model follows Kempen and Hoenkamp (1987) in defining lem-
mas as the smallest units of grammatical encoding. These lemmas were 
semantic and syntactic entities. Retrieving lemmas for content words 
from the mental lexicon involved matching a conceptual structure in the 
input message to the semantic structure of the lemma. A major observa-
tion at that stage of theory formation was that all existing theories of 
lexical selection in speech production were deeply flawed. They all ran 
into the “hyperonym problem”: the speaker would select an item’s super-
ordinates instead of, or in addition to, the target itself. This was, essen-
tially, due to the fact that if a word’s critical semantic features are all 
activated or selected, then the critical features of any of its superordinates 
(or “hyperonyms”) are necessarily also activated or selected; they form, 
after all, a subset of the target word’s critical features. Roelofs (1992) 
solved this problem by splitting up the lemma into a “lexical concept” 
and a “syntactic lemma” (or “lemma” for short). If the terminal elements 
of the speaker’s message are “whole” lexical concepts, lexical selection is, 
essentially, a one-to-one mapping of lexical concepts to syntactic lemmas. 
Lexical concepts are no longer sets or bundles of features. Their semantics 
Relations between Speech Production and Speech Perception 245 
is handled by the relational, labeled network that connects them. The 
hyperonym problem vanishes, and a more realistic issue arises: What hap-
pens if more than a single lexical concept, in particular semantically re-
lated concepts, are (co-)activated during conceptual preparation of the 
message? Multiple activation of lemmas will be the result and there is a 
selection problem that should be solved “in real time.” The computa-
tional model, now called WEAVER (Roelofs, 1992, 1997; see figure 14.1 
for a fragment), handles this issue in detail and is meanwhile supported 
by a plethora of chronometric experimental data. The (syntactic) lemma 
is the unit of grammatical encoding. Lemmas are, essentially, lexical 
Figure 14.1 
Fragment of the WEAVER lexical network (for lexical item escort), displaying 
the input connections from the perceptual network. The top half of the network 
is shared between perception and production. The bottom half of the network is 
specific to production, but is three-way–sensitive to input from the perceptual 
system. The perceptual form network is not shown. It produces perceptual input 
to the lemma stratum. Adapted from Levelt et al., 1999. 
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syntactic trees, called “lexical frames” by Kempen (2000; see also Vosse 
and Kempen, 2000). Kempen models grammatical encoding as a unifica-
tion of incrementally selected lexical frames. The output is a surface syn-
tactic tree for the utterance as a whole. 
A standard method in word production research is the picture-word 
interference paradigm. The subject is presented with a picture to be 
named. At the same time, a distractor word is presented, either auditorily 
or printed in the picture. A semantically related distractor can affect 
the response latency. In the WEAVER model this is due to activation 
of the corresponding lemma. Levelt et al. (1999) proposed to account for 
this effect of perception on production by assuming that lemmas are 
shared between speech perception and production (leaving undecided 
how in detail orthographic input affects the corresponding lemma in the 
speech network). The obvious further step was to claim that the lexical 
networks for spoken word perception and spoken word production are 
shared from the lemma level upward. This rather drastic theoretical 
merger has an inevitable consequence. The feedforward from lexical 
concepts to lemmas, required for production, is now complemented 
by feedback from lemmas to lexical concepts, required for spoken word 
understanding, that is, concept-to-lemma connections are bilaterally acti-
vating. We are, as yet, not aware of empirical counterevidence to this 
proposition. 
It would contribute to the aesthetics of this grand unification to make 
the further claim that grammatical encoding and grammatical decoding 
are one. This is exactly the step taken by Kempen (2000; see also Vosse 
and Kempen, 2000). In both encoding and decoding, lexical frames are 
incrementally unified. In the production case, the frames (lemmas) are 
conceptually selected (see above). In the perceptual case, the lexical 
frames are selected on the basis of a recognized phonological code. But 
then, in both modalities, the selected lexical frames unify incrementally, 
growing a syntactic tree, “from left to right.” Although this is a well-
argued and attractive proposal, its empirical consequences need further 
scrutiny. For instance, it should be impossible for the language user to 
simultaneously encode and decode an utterance; that would mix up the 
lemmas in the unification space. Can you parse your interlocutor’s utter-
ance while you are speaking yourself? 
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Connections at the Form Level 
Levelt et al. (1991) proposed that lemma-to-lexeme ( = word form) con-
nections are unilateral. Upon selection of the lemma, activation spreads 
to the form node, but there is no feedback. Both the selection condition 
and the nonfeedback claim have become controversial issues, leading to 
ever-more sophisticated experiments (see Levelt et al., 1999, and Levelt, 
1999, for reviews). If the nonfeedback claim is correct, then the two net-
works cannot share the input and output form level nodes. In other 
words, phonological codes for perception and for production are not 
identical. Dell (1986) proposed a feedback mechanism to explain unmis-
takable facts of speech error distributions. There is usually a lexical bias 
in speech errors (they result in real words a bit more often than random 
segment changes would predict). And there is a statistical preponderance 
of mixed errors (such as cat for rat), where the error is both semantically 
and phonologically related to the target. But these properties can also be 
handled in terms of the internal loop monitoring mechanism discussed 
above. A real word and a word in the correct semantic field have a better 
chance of slipping through the monitor than a nonword or an odd word 
(Levelt, 1989). Another reason for keeping the perception and production 
form nodes apart are reports in the aphasiological literature of selective 
losses of word perception vs. word production (cf. Caplan, 1992). 
Still, the form networks for perception and production must be con-
nected in some way. Given the evidence from picture-word interference 
experiments, Levelt et al. (1999) made the following two assumptions: 
First, a distractor word, whether spoken or written, affects the corre-
sponding morpheme node (which represents the phonological code) in 
the production network; the details of the perceptual mechanism were 
left unspecified (see figure 14.1). Second, active phonological segments 
in the perceptual network can also affect the corresponding segment 
nodes in the production lexicon. Again, the precise perceptual mechanism 
was left unspecified (see figure 14.1). A possible further specification may 
be achieved in terms of the merge model of Norris, McQueen, and Cutler 
(Meyer and Levelt, 2000). In short, we assume the existence of close con-
nections at the form level, though without sharing of segmental or mor-
phological nodes. What this means in neuroarchitectonic terms is a 
fascinating issue, to which I return below. 
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Still entirely open are potential relations at the phonetic level. Gestural 
scores in the production model, whether for segments, syllables, or whole 
words, are abstract motor representations. Levelt and Wheeldon (1994) 
proposed the existence of a “syllabary,” a repository of gestural scores 
for high-frequency syllables. English (just as Dutch or German) speakers 
do about 80 percent of their talking with no more than 500 different 
syllables. One would expect such highly overlearned motor actions to be 
appropriately stored in the frontal region of the brain. In our model (Lev-
elt et al., 1999), these syllabic gestures are accessed on the fly, as phono-
logical encoding proceeds. As soon as a selected lemma has activated its 
phonological code, the activated phonological segments are incrementally 
packaged into phonological syllables, often ignoring lexical boundaries 
(as in I’ll-sen-dit). Each such composed syllable accesses “its” gestural 
score, which can be almost immediately executed by the articulatory sys-
tem. We have, so far, not made any assumptions about potential relations 
between retrieving gestural scores and perceptual representations of sylla-
bles or other sublexical units. I presently return to that issue. 
Some Neurophysiological Observations 
Mehler, Morton, and Jusczyk concluded their extensive paper “On Re-
ducing Language to Biology” (1984) as follows: “We have argued that 
if a mapping between psychological processing and neurophysiological 
structures is possible, it will only come about after the key theoretical 
constructs are established for each level of explanation. In the interim, 
there are restricted circumstances in which neurophysiological observa-
tions can play a role in the development of psychological models. But 
these circumstances require the consideration of such evidence, not only 
in terms of the physiological organization of the brain, but also in terms 
of its functional organization” (p. 111). This statement has gained new 
force in the present era of cognitive neuroimaging. What emerges as rele-
vant and lasting contributions after a decade of exploring the new tools 
are those studies that were theoretically driven. They are the studies 
where the experimental and control tasks are derived from an explicit 
theory of the underlying cognitive process. Where this was not the case, 
as in most neuroimaging studies of word production, a post hoc theoreti-
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cally driven meta-analysis can still reveal patterns in the data that were 
not apparent in any of the individual studies themselves (Indefrey and 
Levelt, 2000; Levelt and Indefrey, 2000). 
Since 1984 major strides have been made in unraveling the functional 
organization of both speech production and perception, in particular as 
far as the production and perception of spoken words are concerned. In 
addition, as discussed in the previous section, the issues about the rela-
tions between these two processing modalities can now be stated in ex-
plicit theoretical terms. In other words, the “interim” condition in the 
conclusion of Mehler et al. is sufficiently satisfied to scan the recent 
neuroimaging evidence for suggestions that can further the modeling of 
production-perception relations. Here are a few such “neurophysiologi-
cal observations”: 
Self-Monitoring 
According to the perceptual loop hypothesis, reviewed above, both the 
external and the internal feedback are processed by the language user’s 
normal speech-understanding system. This hypothesis is controversial in 
the literature (MacKay, 1992; Levelt 1992; Hartsuiker and Kolk, 2001), 
not only for its own sake but also because of its role in accounting for 
lexical bias and mixed errors in the speech error literature. McGuire, 
Silbersweig, and Frith (1996) have provided PET data that strongly 
support the notion of the speech perceptual system being involved in self-
monitoring. If self-generated speech is fed back in a distorted fashion 
(pitch-transformed), there is increased bilateral activation of lateral tem-
poral cortex (BA 21/22), and in particular of the left superior temporal 
sulcus (see figure 14.2). A highly similar activation of temporal areas is 
obtained when not the own voice but an alien voice is fed back to the 
speaker. These and other findings lead to the conclusion “that i) self- and 
externally-generated speech are processed in similar regions of temporal 
cortex, and ii) the monitoring of self-generated speech involves the tem-
poral cortex bilaterally, and engages areas concerned with the processing 
of speech which has been generated externally” (McGuire et al., 1996, 
p . 101). 
However, these data only concern the external loop. Is the auditory 
perceptual system also involved when the subject speaks “silently,” not 
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Figure 14.2 
Schematic lateral view of the left hemisphere with pointers to regions discussed 
in the text. 
producing an overt auditory signal? Paus et al. (1996) have provided 
relevant evidence on this point. In their PET experiment the subject 
whispered a string of syllables, with rate of production as the independent 
variable (30 through 150 syllables per minute). The authors observed 
a concomitant increase of activation in left auditory cortex, affecting 
two regions in particular: (1) an auditory region on the planum tem-
porale, just posterior to Heschl’s gyrus, and (2) an auditory region in 
the caudal portion of the Sylvian fissure. Hence, these regions might 
qualify as candidates for the reception of the speaker’s internal feed-
back. Finally, Levelt and Indefrey (2000) discuss the possibility that the 
midsuperior temporal gyrus activation that is obtained even in nonword 
production tasks (as in nonword reading) may reflect overt or covert 
self-monitoring. 
The Indefrey and Levelt meta-analysis has not provided the final an-
swer with respect to the localization of rapid syllabification. As discussed 
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below, the imaging evidence points to both Broca’s region and the mid-
superior temporal gyrus (see figure 14.2). We do know, however, that 
internal self-monitoring concerns a syllabified phonological representa-
tion (Wheeldon and Levelt, 1995). If that representation is created in 
Broca’s area, it must be fed back to the relevant areas in the superior 
temporal gyrus where the monitoring takes place. Which anatomical 
pathway could be involved here? There is less of an anatomical problem 
if phonological syllabification itself involves the mid or posterior regions 
of the superior temporal gyrus (or as suggested by Hickok and Poeppel, 
2000, some inferior parietal region). 
Phonological Codes 
The meta-analysis by Indefrey and Levelt (2000) strongly supports Wer-
nicke’s original notion that retrieving a word’s phonological code for pro-
duction involves what has since been called Wernicke’s area. The 
neuroimaging data show, in particular, that if word production tasks 
(which all involve retrieving the words’ phonological codes) are com-
pared to nonword reading tasks (which do not require access to a phono-
logical code), the critical difference in activation concerns Wernicke’s 
area. In an MEG study of picture naming, Levelt et al. (1998) also showed 
dipoles in Wernicke’s area, more precisely in the supratemporal plane 
vicinity, becoming active during a time interval in which phonological 
access is achieved. As discussed above, phonological codes in the produc-
tion system can be perceptually primed, both by auditory and visual word 
or segment/letter stimuli. This may well involve part of Wernicke’s area. 
Which part? Zattore et al. (1992) and Calvert et al. (1997) have shown 
the involvement of the left posterior supratemporal plane (STP), or pla-
num temporale, in the perception of speech, and even in active lip reading. 
Recently, Hickok et al. (2000), in an fMRI study of picture naming, 
showed this area also to be involved in the subvocal production of words. 
If this is the region where the supposed linkage between the perceptual 
and production systems is established, then it is important to note that 
the relevant perceptual output is quite abstract. It may as well result from 
speech input as from reading the lips. Can it also be the output of seeing 
a printed word? If so, we are probably dealing with a phonemic level of 
representation. 
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A review by Hickok and Poeppel (2000), combining several sources of 
patient and imaging data, suggests that the auditory-to-motor interface 
involves a “dorsal pathway” from the just-mentioned region in the left 
posterior superior temporal gyrus through the inferior parietal lobe to-
ward the frontal motor speech areas (see figure 14.2). They make the 
explicit suggestion that the auditory-motor interface operations have 
their site in the left inferior parietal lobe. Although this issue is far from 
solved, one must be careful not to confuse auditory phonemic codes and 
phonemic codes for production. They are clearly linked, behaviorally and 
in terms of functional anatomy, but they are not identical. 
Syllabification and Phonetic Encoding 
The above-mentioned meta-analysis of word production studies (Indefrey 
and Levelt, 2000) pointed to the left posterior inferior frontal lobe and 
the left midsuperior temporal gyrus as being involved in phonological 
encoding, which is largely rapid syllabification in word production tasks. 
Not surprisingly, the same study showed bilateral, mostly ventral sensori-
motor area involvement in actual articulation. Some speculation should 
be allowed in a Festschrift. The mentioned inferior frontal lobe involve-
ment may extend beyond strict phonological encoding and also include 
accessing the gestural scores for successive syllables. In other words, the 
region would somehow store, retrieve, and concatenate our overlearned 
articulatory patterns for syllables and other high-frequency articulatory 
units, such as whole bi- or trisyllabic high-frequency words. More spe-
cifically, one would conjecture the involvement of Broca’s area, which is, 
in a way, premotor area. It is, after all, the human homologue of premo-
tor area F5 in the macaque (Broca’s area is, however, different from F5 
in terms of its cytoarchitecture; it contains a layer IV, which is absent in 
our and the macaque’s premotor cortex; K. Zilles, personal communica-
tion). Having mentioned F5, a discussion of mirror neurons is unavoid-
able (see Gallese and Goldman, 1999, for a review). If (the larger) Broca’s 
region is involved in rapidly accessing syllabic gestures, and if it shares 
with F5 its mirror-neuron character, one would expect the area to repre-
sent perceived articulatory gestures as well, that is, what one sees when 
looking at a speaking face. As early as 1984, Mehler et al. discussed such 
a possibility in connection with Ojemann’s (1983) observation that the 
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(larger) cortical area “has common properties of speech perception and 
generation of motor output.” These common properties, according to 
Ojemann, may serve functions “described by the motor theory of speech 
perception” (cf. Liberman, 1996). 
If this speculation is of any value, one should be able to prime the 
production of a syllable by having a speaker look at a speaking face (on 
the monitor) that produces the same target syllable. That experiment, 
with all its controls, was recently run by Kerzel and Bekkering (2000), 
with the predicted result. Still to be shown is that the effect involves Bro-
ca’s area or immediately neighboring regions. If so, we are back to Wer-
nicke in a new guise. Wernicke located the auditory word images in the 
posterior superior temporal area and the motor word images in Broca’s 
area. He supposed the existence of a connection between the two areas, 
now known to be the arcuate fascicle. That connection is, according to 
Wernicke, involved in spoken word repetition: the auditory word image 
activates the corresponding motor word image. Our chronometric work 
on phonological encoding suggests that an “auditory image” can affect 
the activation of individual segments in the same or another word’s pho-
nological code, that is, the code on which word production is based. As 
mentioned above, retrieving this detailed, segmented code seems to in-
volve Wernicke’s area. 
In the WEAVER model, these phonological segments directly affect the 
activation state of all gestural scores in which they participate. These 
whole “motor images” for high-frequency syllables are now suggested 
to be located in the Broca or premotor region. If they are indeed 
“mirror images,” they represent both our own overlearned articulatory 
gestures and the ones we perceive on the face of our interlocutors. How-
ever, they are not auditory images. The auditory-phonemic link between 
spoken word perception and word production can stay restricted to Wer-
nicke’s area, the midsuperior temporal gyrus, the planum temporale, and 
maybe the inferior parietal region, as long as no evidence to the contrary 
appears. 
Finally, it should be noted that among these syllabic scores are all the 
articulatory scores for high-frequency monosyllabic words. It is a minor 
step to suppose that there are also whole stored scores for high-frequency 
combinations of syllables, in particular of disyllabic or even trisyllabic 
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high-frequency words. If, as Wernicke supposed, these motor images can 
also be directly activated by “object images,” that is, conceptually, spo-
ken word production is to some extent possible without input from 
Wernicke’s area. However, the fine-tuning of phonological word encod-
ing requires access to detailed phonological codes. Precise syllabification 
without paraphasias, resyllabification in context (such as liaison in 
French), and correct stress assignment will always depend on accurate 
phonemic input from our repository of phonological codes, which, I sug-
gest, involves Wernicke’s area. Indefrey et al. (1998) provide fMRI evi-
dence that their assembly involves left lateralized premotor cortex. 
Phonotactic assembly and the ultimate access to stored articulatory pat-
terns are somehow handled by posterior inferior frontal areas. 
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